From: | Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> |
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To: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>, Konstantin Knizhnik <k(dot)knizhnik(at)postgrespro(dot)ru> |
Subject: | Re: disable SSL compression? |
Date: | 2018-04-02 15:49:56 |
Message-ID: | 67de0352-4bc4-9da1-756a-45545fdbb239@2ndquadrant.com |
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Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On 4/2/18 11:05, Robert Haas wrote:
> Ah. Yeah, that makes sense. Although to use PG as a vector, it seems
> like the attacker would need to the ability to snoop network traffic
> between the application server and PG. If both of those are
> presumably inside the bank's network and yet an attacker can sniff
> them, to some degree you've already lost. Now it could be that a
> rogue bank employee is trying to gain access from within the bank, or
> maybe your bank exposes application-to-database traffic on the public
> Internet. But in general that seems like traffic that should be
> well-secured anyway for lots of reasons, as opposed to the case where
> one part of your browser is trying to hide information from another
> part of your browser, which is a lot harder to isolate thoroughly.
I agree the attack is less likely to be applicable in typical database
installations. I think we should move forward with considering protocol
compression proposals, but any final result should put a warning in the
documentation that using compression is potentially insecure.
--
Peter Eisentraut http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
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