Re: disable SSL compression?

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>, Konstantin Knizhnik <k(dot)knizhnik(at)postgrespro(dot)ru>
Subject: Re: disable SSL compression?
Date: 2018-04-02 16:46:25
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Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
> I agree the attack is less likely to be applicable in typical database
> installations. I think we should move forward with considering protocol
> compression proposals, but any final result should put a warning in the
> documentation that using compression is potentially insecure.

It seemed like the attack you described wasn't all that dependent on
whether the data is compressed or not: if you can see the size of the
server's reply to "select ... where account_number = x", you can pretty
well tell the difference between 0 and 1 rows, with or without
compression. So I'm still not very clear on what the threat model is.

regards, tom lane

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