| From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
|---|---|
| To: | Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>, Konstantin Knizhnik <k(dot)knizhnik(at)postgrespro(dot)ru> |
| Subject: | Re: disable SSL compression? |
| Date: | 2018-04-02 16:46:25 |
| Message-ID: | 321.1522687585@sss.pgh.pa.us |
| Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
| Thread: | |
| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
> I agree the attack is less likely to be applicable in typical database
> installations. I think we should move forward with considering protocol
> compression proposals, but any final result should put a warning in the
> documentation that using compression is potentially insecure.
It seemed like the attack you described wasn't all that dependent on
whether the data is compressed or not: if you can see the size of the
server's reply to "select ... where account_number = x", you can pretty
well tell the difference between 0 and 1 rows, with or without
compression. So I'm still not very clear on what the threat model is.
regards, tom lane
| From | Date | Subject | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Next Message | Peter Eisentraut | 2018-04-02 16:49:07 | Re: tab complete for procedures for \sf and \ef commands |
| Previous Message | Dmitry Ivanov | 2018-04-02 16:41:51 | Re: new function for tsquery creartion |