| From: | Sasasu <i(at)sasa(dot)su> |
|---|---|
| To: | Tomas Vondra <tomas(dot)vondra(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> |
| Cc: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption |
| Date: | 2021-10-18 02:19:48 |
| Message-ID: | f5d156bc-8532-d958-0a26-c9271b9c2960@sasa.su |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Just a mention. the HMAC (or AE/AD) can be disabled in AES-GCM. HMAC in
AES-GCM is an encrypt-then-hash MAC.
CRC-32 is not a crypto-safe hash (technically CRC-32 is not a hash
function). Cryptographers may unhappy with CRC-32.
I think CRC or SHA is not such important. If IV can be stored, I believe
there should have enough space to store HMAC.
On 2021/10/18 05:23, Tomas Vondra wrote:
>
> I've argued for storing the nonce, but I don't quite see why would we
> need integrity guarantees?
| Attachment | Content-Type | Size |
|---|---|---|
| OpenPGP_0x4E72AF09097DAE2E.asc | application/pgp-keys | 7.9 KB |
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