Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption

From: Sasasu <i(at)sasa(dot)su>
To: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>
Cc: PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption
Date: 2021-10-18 02:35:48
Message-ID: 01cc0870-5526-de25-7ab5-55247f7cfca6@sasa.su
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On 2021/10/16 04:57, Tomas Vondra wrote:
>
> Seems reasonable, on the assumption the threat models are the same.

On 2021/10/16 03:22, Stephen Frost wrote:
> plain64: the initial vector is the 64-bit little-endian version of the
> sector number, padded with zeros if necessary
>
> That is, the default for LUKS is AES, XTS, with a simple IV. That
> strikes me as a pretty ringing endorsement
On 2021/10/18 05:23, Tomas Vondra wrote:
>
> AFAICS the threat model the patch aims to address is an attacker who can
> observe the data (e.g. a low-privileged OS user), but can't modify the
> files. Which seems like a reasonable model for shared environments.

I agree this threat model.

And if PostgreSQL is using XTS, there is no different with dm-encrypt.
The user can use dm-encrypt directly.

Attachment Content-Type Size
OpenPGP_0x4E72AF09097DAE2E.asc application/pgp-keys 7.9 KB

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