Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

From: Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
Date: 2019-02-06 19:08:57
Message-ID: CALtqXTewBFhqp6Hiw_g8if_Gg9VTTW24SXibu-5dnR_GXAY14w@mail.gmail.com
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers

On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:37 PM Moon, Insung <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>
wrote:

> Dear Tom Lane.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Tom Lane [mailto:tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us]
> > Sent: Monday, June 18, 2018 11:52 PM
> > To: Robert Haas
> > Cc: Joe Conway; Masahiko Sawada; Moon, Insung; PostgreSQL-development
> > Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE)
> and Key Management Service (KMS)
> >
> > Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> > > On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 10:12 AM, Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>
> wrote:
> > >> Not necessarily. Our pages probably have enough predictable bytes to
> > >> aid cryptanalysis, compared to user data in a column which might not
> > >> be very predicable.
> >
> > > Really? I would guess that the amount of entropy in a page is WAY
> > > higher than in an individual column value.
> >
> > Depending on the specifics of the encryption scheme, having some amount
> of known (or guessable) plaintext may allow breaking
> > the cipher, even if much of the plaintext is not known. This is
> cryptology 101, really.
> >
> > At the same time, having to have a bunch of independently-decipherable
> short field values is not real secure either, especially
> > if they're known to all be encrypted with the same key. But what you
> know or can guess about the plaintext in such cases
> > would be target-specific, rather than an attack that could be built once
> and used against any PG database.
>
> Yes. If there is known to guessable data of encrypted data, maybe there is
> a possibility of decrypting the encrypted data.
>
> But would it be safe to use an additional encryption mode such as GCM or
> XFS to solve this problem?
> (Do not use the same IV)
>
> Thank you and Best regards.
> Moon.
>
>
> >
> > regards, tom lane
>
>
>
>
>
Hi Moon,

Have you done progress on that patch? I am thinking to work on the project
and found that you are already working on it. The last message is almost
six months old. I want to check with you that are you still working on
that, if yes I can help on that by reviewing the patch etc. If you are not
working on that anymore, can you share your done work (if possible)?
--
Ibrar Ahmed

In response to

Responses

Browse pgsql-hackers by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Jakub Glapa 2019-02-06 19:32:38 Re: pg11.1: dsa_area could not attach to segment
Previous Message Justin Pryzby 2019-02-06 18:52:41 Re: pg11.1: dsa_area could not attach to segment