RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

From: "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>
To: "'Ibrar Ahmed'" <ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: "'PostgreSQL-development'" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
Date: 2019-02-07 00:27:04
Message-ID: 007a01d4be7b$da280e20$8e782a60$@lab.ntt.co.jp
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Dear Ibrar Ahmed.

From: Ibrar Ahmed [mailto:ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com]
Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2019 4:09 AM
To: Moon, Insung
Cc: Tom Lane; PostgreSQL-development
Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:37 PM Moon, Insung <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp> wrote:
Dear Tom Lane.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tom Lane [mailto:tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us]
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2018 11:52 PM
> To: Robert Haas
> Cc: Joe Conway; Masahiko Sawada; Moon, Insung; PostgreSQL-development
> Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
>
> Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> > On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 10:12 AM, Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com> wrote:
> >> Not necessarily. Our pages probably have enough predictable bytes to
> >> aid cryptanalysis, compared to user data in a column which might not
> >> be very predicable.
>
> > Really? I would guess that the amount of entropy in a page is WAY
> > higher than in an individual column value.
>
> Depending on the specifics of the encryption scheme, having some amount of known (or guessable) plaintext may allow breaking
> the cipher, even if much of the plaintext is not known. This is cryptology 101, really.
>
> At the same time, having to have a bunch of independently-decipherable short field values is not real secure either, especially
> if they're known to all be encrypted with the same key. But what you know or can guess about the plaintext in such cases
> would be target-specific, rather than an attack that could be built once and used against any PG database.

> > Yes. If there is known to guessable data of encrypted data, maybe there is a possibility of decrypting the encrypted data.
> >
> > But would it be safe to use an additional encryption mode such as GCM or XFS to solve this problem?
> > (Do not use the same IV)
> > Thank you and Best regards.
> > Moon.
>
> >
> > regards, tom lane

> Hi Moon,
>
> Have you done progress on that patch? I am thinking to work on the project and found that you are already working on it. The last message is almost six months old. I want to check with you that are you still working on that, if yes I can help on that by reviewing the patch etc. If you are not working on that anymore, can you share your done work (if possible)?
> --
> Ibrar Ahmed

We are currently developing for TDE and integration KMS.
So, We will Also be prepared to start a new discussion with the PoC patch as soon as possible.

At currently, we have changed the development direction of a per-Tablespace unit by per-table
Also, currently researching how to associate with KMIP protocol related to the encryption key for integration with KMS.
We talked about this in the Unconference session of PGConf.ASIA,
And a week ago, we talked about the development direction of TDE and integration with KMS at FOSDEM PGDAY[1].

We will soon provide PoC with new discussions.

Regards.

[1] TRANSPARENT DATA ENCRYPTION IN POSTGRESQL AND INTEGRATION WITH KEY MANAGEMENT SERVICES
https://www.postgresql.eu/events/fosdem2019/schedule/session/2307-transparent-data-encryption-in-postgresql-and-integration-with-key-management-services/

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