| From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
|---|---|
| To: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Satyanarayana Narlapuram <Satyanarayana(dot)Narlapuram(at)microsoft(dot)com>, Craig Ringer <craig(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: [HACKERS] Client Connection redirection support for PostgreSQL |
| Date: | 2018-02-13 22:23:21 |
| Message-ID: | 8435.1518560601@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> -- might need some defense against the redirected-to server getting
> the same password as was sent to the original server. Is that a
> security risk? Does HTTP have a rule about this?
Without having read any of the previous discussion ... I'd say that if the
redirect info is placed in pg_hba.conf then I would expect a redirect to
happen before any authentication exchange, so that this is not an issue.
Perhaps it would be a good security measure for clients to refuse a
redirect once they've sent any auth-related messages.
But ... pg_hba.conf? Really? Surely that is a completely random and
inappropriate place to control redirection?
regards, tom lane
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