Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: Kevin Grittner <Kevin(dot)Grittner(at)wicourts(dot)gov>, Noah Misch <noah(at)leadboat(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
Date: 2012-07-20 19:45:15
Message-ID: 29738.1342813515@sss.pgh.pa.us
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> I don't particularly care for that solution; it seems like a kludge.
> I've kind of wondered whether we ought to have checks in all the ALTER
> routines that spit up if you try to ALTER an extension member from any
> place other than an extension upgrade script... but that still
> wouldn't prevent the extension owner from dropping the members out of
> the extension and then modifying them afterwards. I'm not sure we
> want to prevent that in general, but maybe there could be some
> locked-down mode that has that effect.

Right, I wasn't too clear about that, but I meant that we'd have some
sort of locked-down state for an extension that would forbid fooling
with its contents. For development purposes, or for anybody that "knows
what they're doing", adding/subtracting/modifying member objects is
mighty handy. But a non-superuser who's loaded an extension that
contains C functions ought not have those privileges for it.

regards, tom lane

In response to

Responses

Browse pgsql-hackers by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Robert Haas 2012-07-20 19:51:04 Re: Event Triggers reduced, v1
Previous Message Robert Haas 2012-07-20 19:39:33 Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)