Re: Delegating superuser tasks to new security roles (Was: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers)

From: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)alvh(dot)no-ip(dot)org>
To: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Mark Dilger <mark(dot)dilger(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Noah Misch <noah(at)leadboat(dot)com>, Jacob Champion <pchampion(at)vmware(dot)com>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, "chap(at)anastigmatix(dot)net" <chap(at)anastigmatix(dot)net>, torikoshia <torikoshia(at)oss(dot)nttdata(dot)com>
Subject: Re: Delegating superuser tasks to new security roles (Was: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers)
Date: 2021-07-26 21:16:25
Message-ID: 202107262116.cqtg2wflgsyx@alvherre.pgsql
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On 2021-Jul-26, Tom Lane wrote:

> Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> writes:
> > ... Tom's suggestion
> > would work, of course, but it would mean having to create event triggers
> > for all the roles in the system, and would those roles who own those
> > event triggers be able to disable them..?
>
> Uh, why not? If you own the trigger, you can drop it, so why shouldn't
> you be able to temporarily disable it?

I think an auditing system that can be turned off by the audited user is
pretty much useless. Or did I misunderstood what you are suggesting?

--
Álvaro Herrera Valdivia, Chile — https://www.EnterpriseDB.com/
"Crear es tan difícil como ser libre" (Elsa Triolet)

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