Re: Why is materialized view creation a "security-restricted operation"?

From: Adrian Klaver <adrian(dot)klaver(at)aklaver(dot)com>
To: Thiemo Kellner <thiemo(at)gelassene-pferde(dot)biz>, pgsql-general(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Why is materialized view creation a "security-restricted operation"?
Date: 2026-10-04 20:24:41
Message-ID: e26681b8-695d-45d4-9359-af12ce33dcfe@aklaver.com
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On 10/4/26 12:27 PM, Thiemo Kellner wrote:
> Hi
>
> Giving my two dimes. I apologise if some else has given it already. And
> it is quite an operations point of view and mostly based on Oracle. To
> the best of my knowledge, it applies to Postgres even more.
>
> The data of DB temp tables are not visible outside of the session that
> has put it in. In the case of trying to find the problem of code of
> functions storing intermediary results, they are just not visible for
> the investigator such that one has to do all the steps manually to
> detect the point where things go wrong. In my opinion a real pita.

I am not quite following the above.

Do you mean:

1) Not having access to the function code ?

2) Having access to function code, but not the source of data?

>
> Cheers
>
> Thiemo

--
Adrian Klaver
adrian(dot)klaver(at)aklaver(dot)com

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