|From:||Julian Markwort <julian(dot)markwort(at)uni-muenster(dot)de>|
|To:||Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>|
|Cc:||Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>|
|Subject:||Re: [PATCH] pgpassfile connection option|
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On 09/26/2016 07:51 PM, Robert Haas wrote:
> However, they don't have
> to accept the possibility that arbitrary local files readable by the
> user ID will be used for authentication and/or disclosed; this patch
> would force them to accept that risk.
I do agree with you, however we might have to take a look at the
parameter sslkey's implementation here as well - There are no checks in
place to stop you from using rogue sslkey parameters.
I'd like to suggest having both of these parameters behave in a similar
fashion. In order to achieve safe behaviour, we could implement the use
of environment variables prohibiting the use of user-located pgpassfiles
How about PGSECRETSLOCATIONLOCK ?
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