|From:||Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>|
|To:||Daniel Gustafsson <daniel(at)yesql(dot)se>|
|Cc:||"Jonathan S(dot) Katz" <jkatz(at)postgresql(dot)org>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>|
|Subject:||Re: User functions for building SCRAM secrets|
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On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 09:32:34PM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> On the whole I tend to agree with Jacob upthread, while this does provide
> consistency it doesn't seem to move the needle for best practices. Allowing
> scram_build_secret_sha256('password', 'a', 1); with the password potentially
> going in cleartext over the wire and into the logs doesn't seem like a great
> tradeoff for the (IMHO) niche usecases it would satisfy.
Should we try to make \password and libpq more flexible instead? Two
things got discussed in this area since v10:
- The length of the random salt.
- The iteration number.
Or we could bump up the defaults, and come back to that in a few
years, again.. ;p
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