From: | "DINESH NAIR" <Dinesh_Nair(at)iitmpravartak(dot)net> |
---|---|
To: | Dominique Devienne <ddevienne(at)gmail(dot)com>, Pavel Luzanov <p(dot)luzanov(at)postgrespro(dot)ru> |
Cc: | Laurenz Albe <laurenz(dot)albe(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Karsten Hilbert <Karsten(dot)Hilbert(at)gmx(dot)net>, "pgsql-general(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-general(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Q: GRANT ... WITH ADMIN on PG 17 |
Date: | 2025-08-25 18:42:20 |
Message-ID: | PN4P287MB43818ADFFE18231855EE1A799C3EA@PN4P287MB4381.INDP287.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM |
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Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-general |
Hi ,
Found this interesting :
"gm-dbo" can manage membership in "gm-doctors" (ADMIN TRUE), but does not inherit
the role's privileges, nor can "gm-dbo" assume the identity of "gm-doctors".
INHERIT option should be used in caution to reduce the risk of privilege escalation, especially for sensitive roles:
*
Set NOINHERIT to TRUE on roles with elevated privileges (e.g., roles that have SUPERUSER, CREATEDB, CREATEROLE, or access to critical data or functions).
*
Tag such roles as sensitive, and prioritize restricting their inheritance to avoid unintended privilege propagation.
*
Enforce role separation by ensuring that users can manage sensitive roles without inheriting their privileges.
Thanks & Regards
Dinesh Nair
________________________________
From: Dominique Devienne <ddevienne(at)gmail(dot)com>
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2025 6:08 PM
To: Pavel Luzanov <p(dot)luzanov(at)postgrespro(dot)ru>
Cc: Laurenz Albe <laurenz(dot)albe(at)cybertec(dot)at>; Karsten Hilbert <Karsten(dot)Hilbert(at)gmx(dot)net>; pgsql-general(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org <pgsql-general(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Q: GRANT ... WITH ADMIN on PG 17
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On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 2:22 PM Pavel Luzanov <p(dot)luzanov(at)postgrespro(dot)ru> wrote:
>> On 22.08.2025 11:40, Laurenz Albe wrote:
>> Yes, that should work as follows: [...]
> [...] A safer option is to use security definer function to grant membership
FWIW, it's basically what I did.
My primary "admin" application role lost CREATEROLE,
and instead gained EXECUTE on security-definer procs
from a new lower-level role (with CREATEROLE),
in a new separate schema, which does all create/drop
roles or grant/revoke DDLs.
Which has the added benefits to enforce naming conventions for roles,
to enforce grants are only between our "per-DB" roles,
and made it easy to generate an audit-log for all those DDLs.
So the v16 ROLE changes created a BIG MESS for us,
slowing us down quite a bit, but we ended up with a much
better "v2" architecture, so it was not all a loss... YMMV.
So +1 to Pavel. --DD
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