Re: Request for cryptographic mechanisms used in PostgreSQL

You can't write a document about your own prod systems without knowing what
(if any!) cryptography *your* prod systems use.

On Wed, Jan 21, 2026 at 1:27 AM ManiR <mani(dot)retnaswamy(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> Thank you for the responses and suggestions so far.
>
> We understand the suggestion to use an LLM as a starting point; however,
> for our compliance and audit requirements, we would like to ensure that the
> resulting CBOM is technically accurate and well-grounded in PostgreSQL’s
> actual behavior.
>
> Could you please let us know:
>
> -
>
> whether there are any *existing sample CBOMs or similar cryptographic
> inventories* available for PostgreSQL (even informal or
> community-created ones), and
> -
>
> what would be the *recommended approach or steps* to identify and
> document PostgreSQL’s cryptographic mechanisms accurately.
>
> If anyone has previously undertaken a *similar exercise* (CBOM, crypto
> inventory, or security documentation) for PostgreSQL, any guidance,
> references, or documentation outlining the *process followed* would be
> greatly appreciated.
>
> Thank you again for your time and help.
>
> Regards,
>
> Manikandan R
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 21, 2026 at 1:34 AM Nico Williams <nico(at)cryptonector(dot)com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 02:47:36PM +0530, ManiR wrote:
>> > We would like your guidance on the *cryptographic mechanisms used by
>> > PostgreSQL*, including:
>>
>> FYI this is the sort of thing where LLMs shine. I would start by asking
>> an LLM to write this and then I'd have expert humans review it.
>>
>> Keep in mind that some of the cryptographic mechanism/algorithm usage is
>> transitive via PostgreSQL's dependencies (e.g., SASL, GSS-API, TLS), but
>> you might not be interested in expanding that (since you might want to
>> do separate CBOMs for those.
>>
>> Keep in mind that some uses are not actually uses, like the PG crypto
>> extension, which makes cryptography available to PG _applications_.
>>
>> You should also look at options to _not_ use cryptographic mechanisms.
>> I.e., options to use cleartext protocols. Obviously it's much worse to
>> have a cleartext protocol than one that uses, say, 1DES, even though
>> 1DES is so weak as to be useles. Often auditors have a blind spot here.
>>
>> And it's important not to treat the presence of, say, MD5 as fatal when
>> it's not being used for security-critical purposes.
>>
>> IMO,
>>
>> Nico
>> --
>>
>

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