Re: Enquiry about TDE with PgSQL

From: Ron Johnson <ronljohnsonjr(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: pgsql-general <pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Enquiry about TDE with PgSQL
Date: 2025-10-31 15:34:45
Message-ID: CANzqJaC378Dt92YCPuuj_eWTY=wE0RQJoMM84gtsX_4mtm156g@mail.gmail.com
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On Fri, Oct 31, 2025 at 11:25 AM Greg Sabino Mullane <htamfids(at)gmail(dot)com>
wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 31, 2025 at 10:54 AM Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> wrote:
>
>> Disk-level and partition-level encryption typically encrypts
>> the entire disk or partition using the same key, with all data
>> automatically decrypted when the system runs or when an authorized
>> --> user requests it. For this reason, disk-level encryption is not
>> --> appropriate to protect stored PAN on computers, laptops, servers,
>> storage arrays, or any other system that provides transparent
>> decryption upon user authentication.
>>
>
> Hmm, I read this a few times but still not sure what the technical
> objection is. Yes, the entire disk is encrypted with the same key, but why
> is that insufficient to protect things? Anyone care to guess what they are
> thinking here?
>

Networking.

Who breaks into a DC and steals a rack of disks or SSDs? Very, very few
evil-doers.
Who hacks into networks and exfiltrates data over the wire? Many hackers.

--
Death to <Redacted>, and butter sauce.
Don't boil me, I'm still alive.
<Redacted> lobster!

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