| From: | Ryan Lambert <ryan(at)rustprooflabs(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>, Antonin Houska <ah(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada(dot)mshk(at)gmail(dot)com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas(dot)vondra(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi(dot)haribabu(at)gmail(dot)com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |
| Date: | 2019-07-10 18:38:02 |
| Message-ID: | CAN-V+g8fCt7OKafNUvBRSevERxt0u1LXJUUh5YwfPyU+6Aa7DA@mail.gmail.com |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
> what is it that gets stored in the page for
> decryption use, the nonce or the IV derived from it?
I believe storing the IV is preferable and still secure per [1]: "The IV
need not be secret"
Beyond needing the database oid, if every decrypt function has to
regenerate the IV from the nonce that will affect performance. I don't
know how expensive the forward hash is but it won't be free.
[1]
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf
*Ryan Lambert*
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