Re: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers

From: Isaac Morland <isaac(dot)morland(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Mark Dilger <mark(dot)dilger(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers
Date: 2021-05-01 03:27:55
Message-ID: CAMsGm5eDn7uBcit=aBvOSmUvPxrdpp1GZZyPVjL+9fUiYm_f8A@mail.gmail.com
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers

On Fri, 30 Apr 2021 at 22:00, Mark Dilger <mark(dot)dilger(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
wrote:

> Viewing all of this in terms of which controls allow the tenant to escape
> a hypothetical sandbox seems like the wrong approach. Shouldn't we let
> service providers decide which controls would allow the tenant to escape
> the specific sandbox the provider has designed?
>

I’m not even sure I should be mentioning this possibility, but what if we
made each GUC parameter a grantable privilege? I’m honestly not sure if
this is insane or not. I mean numerically it’s a lot of privileges, but
conceptually it’s relatively simple.

What I like the least about it is actually the idea of giving up entirely
on the notion of grouping privileges into reasonable packages: some of
these privileges would be quite safe to grant in many or even most
circumstances, while others would usually not be reasonable to grant.

In response to

Browse pgsql-hackers by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Masahiko Sawada 2021-05-01 04:09:13 Re: Transactions involving multiple postgres foreign servers, take 2
Previous Message Mark Dilger 2021-05-01 02:00:35 Re: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers