Re: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and encrypted files

Moin,

On 2019-09-30 23:26, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> For full-cluster Transparent Data Encryption (TDE), the current plan is
> to encrypt all heap and index files, WAL, and all pgsql_tmp (work_mem
> overflow). The plan is:
>
> https://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Transparent_Data_Encryption#TODO_for_Full-Cluster_Encryption
>
> We don't see much value to encrypting vm, fsm, pg_xact, pg_multixact,
> or
> other files. Is that correct? Do any other PGDATA files contain user
> data?

IMHO the general rule in crypto is: encrypt everything, or don't bother.

If you don't encrypt some things, somebody is going to find loopholes
and sidechannels
and partial-plaintext attacks. Just a silly example: If you trick the DB
into putting only one row per page,
any "bit-per-page" map suddenly reveals information about a single
encrypted row that it shouldn't reveal.

Many people with a lot of free time on their hands will sit around,
drink a nice cup of tea and come up
with all sorts of attacks on these things that you didn't (and couldn't)
anticipate now.

So IMHO it would be much better to err on the side of caution and
encrypt everything possible.

Best regards,

Tels