Re: Security implications of config-file-location patch

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Bruce Momjian <pgman(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us>
Cc: Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Security implications of config-file-location patch
Date: 2004-10-08 05:38:19
Message-ID: 8148.1097213899@sss.pgh.pa.us
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Bruce Momjian <pgman(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us> writes:
>> Good point. Should we obscure pg_tablespace similarly to what we do for
>> pg_shadow?

> Well, if we feel file locations are better left only visible to
> super-users, we should. However, when managing disk space, aren't
> normal users also often interested in which disk drives will store their
> data? I don't see a big value to obscuring pgdata myself.

My gut feeling is that it's more important to obscure pgdata than the
external tablespace locations, basically because non-default tablespaces
are likely to be on secondary disks with no particular relationship to
interesting files (such as ~postgres/.profile). I can't back this up
with a hard argument at this late hour though ...

regards, tom lane

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