Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)commandprompt(dot)com>
Cc: pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
Date: 2010-02-19 18:30:49
Message-ID: 6804.1266604249@sss.pgh.pa.us
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Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)commandprompt(dot)com> writes:
> Tom Lane wrote:
>> It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary
>> user to blow away all settings for himself. Even those that are for
>> SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser. Isn't
>> this a security hole? I would expect that an unprivileged user should
>> not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of
>> reverting to the installation-wide default.

> Yes, it is, but this is not a new hole. This works just fine in 8.4
> too:

So I'd argue for changing it in 8.4 too.

regards, tom lane

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