Re: Adding support for SE-Linux security

From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
Cc: Chad Sellers <csellers(at)tresys(dot)com>, "David P(dot) Quigley" <dpquigl(at)tycho(dot)nsa(dot)gov>, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Josh Berkus <josh(at)agliodbs(dot)com>, KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)ak(dot)jp(dot)nec(dot)com>, jd(at)commandprompt(dot)com, David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, Itagaki Takahiro <itagaki(dot)takahiro(at)oss(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)kaigai(dot)gr(dot)jp>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Adding support for SE-Linux security
Date: 2009-12-08 19:22:02
Message-ID: 603c8f070912081122y145d0dacsc002e7b122268223@mail.gmail.com
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers

On Tue, Dec 8, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
> Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
>> One of the major and fundamental stumbling blocks we've run into is
>> that every solution we've looked at so far seems to involve adding
>> SE-Linux-specific checks in many places in the code.  It would be nice
>> if it were possible to use the exist permissions-checking functions
>> and have them check a few more things while they're at it, but it's
>> looking like that won't be feasible, or at least no one's come up with
>> a plausible design yet.
>
> I don't think that it's about SELinux.  The real issue here is that
> KaiGai-san is about a mile out in front of the PG hackers community
> in terms of his ambitions for the scope of what can be controlled by
> security policy.  If the patch were only doing what the community has
> actually agreed to, there would be little need for it to touch anything
> but the aclcheck functions.
>
> Now I recognize that a large part of the potential attraction in this
> for the security community is exactly the idea of having fine-grain
> security control.  But if you ever want anything significantly different
> from SQL-standard permission mechanisms, there's going to have to be a
> whole lot more work done.  Basically, nobody in the PG community has got
> any confidence either in the overall design or the implementation
> details for locking things down that aren't already controlled by SQL
> permission mechanisms.

I think that's basically right. Further, I think this is basically a
resource issue. If you were inclined to spend a large amount of your
time on this problem, you could either gain confidence in the present
design and implementation or come up with a new one in which you did
have confidence. But it doesn't seem important enough to you (or your
employer) for the amount of time it would take, so you're not. I
think there are other committers and community members in a similar
situation - basically all of them.

...Robert

In response to

Responses

Browse pgsql-hackers by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Magnus Hagander 2009-12-08 19:23:10 Re: Install chapter broken link
Previous Message Kevin Grittner 2009-12-08 19:20:32 Re: tsearch parser inefficiency if text includes urls or emails - new version