Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3

Sam Mason wrote:
> Are you a cryptanalyst and are you sure that this doesn't actually make
> things worse? I'm sure it gives you a warm fuzzy feeling that it's
> *got* to be better, but unless someone has done some hard maths I'm not
> sure how you can be so sure.
>
No sadly I am no cryptoanalyst.
> Why not just use SHA-512, you get many more quality bits that way.
>
I would, if it was available in core.
>
>> I would drop md5 totally and use sha1 and ripemd-160 if possible.. but
>> currently i use only md5 as it is the only available one.. Loading
>> pgcrypto is overkill for something as simple as hash-functions.
>>
> Sounds like a good reason for moving the current md5 function out into
> pgcrypto as well! :)
>
I am not sure how I am to understand that comment. But again I am just a
user...
>> * I prepend the id and the username to guard users with weak passwords
>> against known hashvalues (rainbow tables) should the box ever get
>> comprised ...
>>
>
> I take it your threat model doesn't include the attacker logging
> incoming queries to look for the clear-text password.
>
No it doesn't, I am mostly concerned with the grab and run scenario.

I am still convinced having more (and better) hash-functions in core is
a gain for some users.

And it is fairly un-intrusive as the hash functions are well-defined and
never going to change (new ones can be added and old ones deleted, but
SHA256 for example will never change).

I think I will drop the issue as I cannot present formal proof of my
case, sorry to have wasted your time.

Svenne