Re: sandboxing untrusted code

Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> Returning to this topic after some time, I have realized that both of
> these rules are inadequate.
> ... As soon as
> the attacker has *any* influence over what code the victim calls,
> there's a danger of a "confused deputy" attack.

This is true, but I think it's hopeless to imagine that a technical
solution can stop that type of attack altogether. The deception
might happen entirely outside our system; the classical example
being where somebody persuades you to copy-and-paste some shell
code into your terminal window without fully understanding it.

It's certainly likely that there's room for improvement of your
sandboxing ideas, but you shouldn't abandon them because they don't
solve some insoluble problems. If we can make large classes of
attacks infeasible at reasonable cost, we've still accomplished
a lot.

regards, tom lane