Re: WIP: Data at rest encryption

From: Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>
To: Ants Aasma <ants(dot)aasma(at)gmail(dot)com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi(dot)haribabu(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: WIP: Data at rest encryption
Date: 2016-06-13 15:18:12
Message-ID: 29bd8421-d9f5-15fa-48b0-9ebc39ba8f94@2ndquadrant.com
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On 6/12/16 3:13 AM, Ants Aasma wrote:
>> 5. Instead of providing passphrase through environmental variable,
>> > better to provide some options to pg_ctl etc.
> That looks like it would be worse from a security perspective.
> Integrating a passphrase prompt would be an option, but a way for
> scripts to provide passphrases would still be needed.

Environment variables and command-line options are visible to other
processes on the machine, so neither of these approaches is really going
to work. We would need some kind of integration with secure
password-entry mechanisms, such as pinentry.

Also note that all tools that work directly on the data directory would
need password-entry and encryption/decryption support, including
pg_basebackup, pg_controldata, pg_ctl, pg_receivexlog, pg_resetxlog,
pg_rewind, pg_upgrade, pg_xlogdump.

It seems that your implementation doesn't encrypt pg_control, thus
avoiding some of that. But that doesn't seem right.

--
Peter Eisentraut http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services

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