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Re: [INTERFACES] pg_pwd

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Lamar Owen <lamar(dot)owen(at)wgcr(dot)org>
Cc: "Sergio A(dot) Kessler" <ser(at)perio(dot)unlp(dot)edu(dot)ar>, "pgsql-interfaces(at)postgreSQL(dot)org" <pgsql-interfaces(at)postgreSQL(dot)org>
Subject: Re: [INTERFACES] pg_pwd
Date: 1999-11-20 22:57:58
Message-ID: (view raw, whole thread or download thread mbox)
Lists: pgsql-interfaces
Lamar Owen <lamar(dot)owen(at)wgcr(dot)org> writes:
> And yes, this IS a glaring security hole, IF the user postgres has a postgres
> password.  Just WHY is pg_pwd mode 666 in the first place??

Because it's written out with a backend-side COPY operation, and
backend-side COPY makes *every* file it creates mode 666.

As I commented earlier in this thread, I think COPY ought not create
files with looser permissions than 644 (does anyone know why that's
not true already?).  But that still wouldn't be good enough for pg_pwd.

Maybe it would be worthwhile to try to force pg_pwd in particular
to be written with just mode 600.  In the standard configuration that
shouldn't make any difference ... but if people are going to use
hacked-up initdb code, as you evidently are doing, we probably should
not rely on the data directory to be locked up tightly...

			regards, tom lane


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