| From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
|---|---|
| To: | Joshua Tolley <eggyknap(at)gmail(dot)com> |
| Cc: | David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Josh Berkus <josh(at)agliodbs(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: Specification for Trusted PLs? |
| Date: | 2010-05-21 20:04:38 |
| Message-ID: | 23186.1274472278@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Joshua Tolley <eggyknap(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> Agreed. As long as a trusted language can do things outside the
> database only by going through a database and calling some function to
> which the user has rights, in an untrusted language, that seems decent
> to me. A user with permissions to launch_missiles() would have a
> function in an untrusted language to do it, but there's no reason an
> untrusted language shouldn't be able to say "SELECT
s/untrusted/trusted/ here, right?
> launch_missiles()".
To me, as long as they go back into the database via SPI, anything they
can get to from there is OK. What I meant to highlight upthread is that
we don't want trusted functions being able to access other functions
"directly" without going through SQL. As an example, a PL that has FFI
capability sufficient to allow direct access to heap_insert() would
have to be considered untrusted.
regards, tom lane
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