Re: Proof of concept: standalone backend with full FE/BE protocol

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>
Cc: Amit Kapila <amit(dot)kapila(at)huawei(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Proof of concept: standalone backend with full FE/BE protocol
Date: 2012-09-03 19:10:22
Message-ID: 23137.1346699422@sss.pgh.pa.us
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Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net> writes:
> On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 8:51 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
>> I have another question after thinking about that for awhile: is there
>> any security concern there? On Unix-oid systems, we expect the kernel
>> to restrict who can do a kill() on a postgres process. If there's any
>> similar restriction on who can send to that named pipe in the Windows
>> version, it's not obvious from the code. Do we have/need any
>> restriction there?

> We use the default for CreateNamedPipe() which is:
> " The ACLs in the default security descriptor for a named pipe grant
> full control to the LocalSystem account, administrators, and the
> creator owner. They also grant read access to members of the Everyone
> group and the anonymous account."
> (ref: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365150(v=vs.85).aspx)

Hm. The write protections sound fine ... but what's the semantics of
reading, is it like Unix pipes? If so, couldn't a random third party
drain the pipe by reading from it, and thereby cause signals to be lost?

regards, tom lane

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