|From:||Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>|
|Cc:||Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>|
|Subject:||Re: [PATCH] Add `verify-system` sslmode to use system CA pool for server cert|
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On Tue, Sep 28, 2021 at 02:54:39AM -0700, thomas(at)habets(dot)se wrote:
> On Tue, 28 Sep 2021 02:09:11 +0100, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> said:
> > I don't think public CA's are not a good idea for complex setups since
> > they open the ability for an external party to create certificates that
> > are trusted by your server's CA, e.g., certificate authentication.
> I'm not arguing for, and in fact would argue against, public CA for
> client certs.
> So that's a separate issue.
> Note that mTLS prevents a MITM attack that exposes server data even if
> server cert is compromised or re-issued, so if the install is using
> client certs (with private CA) then the public CA for server matters
> much less.
> You can end up at the wrong server, yes, and provide data as INSERT,
> but can't steal or corrupt existing data.
> And you say for complex setups. Fair enough. But currently I'd say the
> default is wrong, and what should be default is not configurable.
Agreed, I think this needs much more discussion and documentation.
If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.
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