From: | Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> |
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To: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> |
Cc: | Masahiko Sawada <sawada(dot)mshk(at)gmail(dot)com>, Antonin Houska <ah(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope(at)jackdb(dot)com>, Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas(dot)vondra(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi(dot)haribabu(at)gmail(dot)com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |
Date: | 2019-08-24 00:27:21 |
Message-ID: | 20190824002721.GA30973@momjian.us |
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Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 10:35:17AM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > Agreed. The features of other databases are a clear source for what we
> > should consider and run through the useful/reasonable filter.
>
> Following on from that- when other databases don't have something that
> we're thinking about implementing, maybe we should be contemplating if
> it really makes sense as a requirement for us.
Yes, that's a good point.
> Specifically in this case- I went back and tried to figure out what
> other database systems have an "encrypt EVERYTHING" option. I didn't
> have much luck finding one though. So I think we need to ask ourselves-
> the "check box" that we're trying to check off with TDE, do the other
> database system check that box? If so, then it looks like the "check
> box" isn't actually "encrypt EVERYTHING", it's more along the lines of
> "make sure all regular user data is encrypted automatically" or some
> such, and that's a very different requirement, which seems to be
> answered by the other systems by having a KMS + tablespace/database
> level encryption. We certainly shouldn't be putting a lot of effort
> into building something that is either overkill or won't be interesting
> to users due to limitations like "have to take the entire cluster
> offline to re-key it".
Well, I think they might do that to reduce encryption overhead. I think
tests have shown that is not an issue, but we will need to test further.
I am not sure of the downside of encrypting everything, since it leaks
the least information and has a minimal user API and code impact. What
is the value of encrypting only the user rows? Better key control?
> Now, that KMS has to be encrypted using a master key, of course, and we
> have to make sure that it is able to survive across a crash, and it'd
> sure be nice if it was indexed. One option for such a KMS would be
> something entirely external (which could potentially just be another PG
> database or something) but it'd be nice if we had something built-in.
> We might also want it to be replicated (or maybe we don't, as was
> discussed on the call, to allow for a replica to use an independent set
> of keys- of course that leads to issues with pg_rewind and such though).
I think the replica could use a different key for the relations, but the
WAL key would have to be the same.
> Anything built-in does seem like it'd be a fair bit of work to get it to
> address those requirements, but that does seem to be what the other
> database systems have done. Unfortunately, their documentation doesn't
> seem to really say exactly what they've done to address that.
I do like they pgcrypto key support to be per-database so pg_dump will
dump the data encrypted, and with its locked keys.
--
Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> http://momjian.us
EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com
+ As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. +
+ Ancient Roman grave inscription +
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