Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 08:44:40PM -0400, Sehrope Sarkuni wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 7:51 PM Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> wrote:
>
> Looking at the bits we have, the IV for AES is 16 bytes.  Since we know
> we have to use LSN (to change the IV for each page write), and the page
> number (so WAL updates that change multiple pages with the same LSN use
> different IVs), that uses 12 bytes:
>
>         LSN         8 bytes
>         page-number 4 bytes
>
> That leaves 4 bytes unused.  If we use CTR, we need 11 bits for the
> counter to support 32k pages sizes (per Sehrope Sarkuni), and we can use
> the remaining 5 bits as constants to indicate heap, index, or WAL.
> (Technically, since we are not encrypting the first 16 bytes, we could
> use one less bit for the counter.)  If we also use relfilenode, that is
> 4 bytes, so we have no bits for the heap/index/WAL constant, and no
> space for the CTR counter, meaning we would have to use CBC mode.
>
>
> You can still use CTR mode and include those to make the key + IV unique by
> adding them to the derived key rather than the IV.
>
> The IV per-page would still be LSN + page-number (with the block number added
> as it's evaluated across the page) and the relfilenode, heap/index, database,
> and anything else to make it unique can be included in the HKDF to create the
> per-file derived key.

I thought if we didn't have to hash the stuff together we would be less
likely to get collisions with the IV.

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Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> http://momjian.us
EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com

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