Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

From: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>
To: Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Ryan Lambert <ryan(at)rustprooflabs(dot)com>, Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>, Antonin Houska <ah(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada(dot)mshk(at)gmail(dot)com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas(dot)vondra(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi(dot)haribabu(at)gmail(dot)com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
Date: 2019-07-10 19:53:55
Message-ID: 20190710195355.GA11798@alvherre.pgsql
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On 2019-Jul-10, Bruce Momjian wrote:

> Good, so I think we all now agree we have to put the nonce
> (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) though the cipher using the secret.

Actually, why do you need the page number in the nonce? The LSN already
distinguishes pages -- you can't have two pages with the same LSN, can
you? (I do think you can have multiple writes of the same page with
different LSNs, if you change hint bits and don't write WAL about it,
but maybe we should force CRC enabled in encrypted tables, which I think
closes this hole?)

--
Álvaro Herrera https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services

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