Re: Postgres 11 release notes

From: Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>
To: Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>
Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>
Subject: Re: Postgres 11 release notes
Date: 2018-05-17 13:55:34
Message-ID: 20180517135534.GA546@momjian.us
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On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 09:09:22PM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > > FYI, I think the server could also require channel binding for SCRAM. We
> > > already have scram-sha-256 in pg_hba.conf, and I think
> > > scram-sha-256-plus would be reasonable.
> >
> > Noted as well. There is of course the question of v10 libpq versions
> > which don't support channel binding, but if an admin is willing to set
> > up scram-sha-256-plus in pg_hba.conf then he can request his users to
> > update his drivers/libs as well.
>
> Yes, I don't see a way around it. Once you accept that someone in the
> middle can change what you request undetected, then you can't do
> fallback. Imagine a man-in-the-middle with TLS where the
> man-in-the-middle allows the two end-points to negotiate the shared
> secret, but the man-in-the-middle forces a weak cipher. This is what is
> happening with Postgres when the man-in-the-middle forces a weaker
> authentication method.

Technically, you can do automatic fallback if the fallback has
man-in-the-middle and downgrade protection. Technically, because TLS is
already active when we start authentication negotiation, we don't need
downgrade protection as long as we have man-in-the-middle protection.

Unfortunately, only SCRAM with channel binding and sslmode=verify-full
have man-in-the-middle protection. Therefore, downgrading from SCRAM
with channel binding to SCRAM without channel binding, MD5, or
'password' is only safe if sslmode=verify-full is enabled. Technically
MD5, or 'password' has weak or non-existent replay protection, but if we
are requiring TLS, then that doesn't really matter, assuming we have
man-in-the-middle protection.

I don't know if falling back from SCRAM with channel binding to a lesser
authentication methods only if sslmode=verify-full is enabled is really
helpful to anyone since it requires certificate installation.

TLS has similar downgrade issues:

http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2012/07/problems_with_secure_upgrade_t.html

but many of its downgrade options have downgrade protection, and you
don't lose man-in-the-middle protection by downgrading.
Man-in-the-middle protection via certificate checking happens
independent of the TLS version being used, which is not the case for
Postgres authentication downgrade options.

--
Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> http://momjian.us
EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com

+ As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. +
+ Ancient Roman grave inscription +

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