|From:||Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>|
|To:||Fujii Masao <masao(dot)fujii(at)oss(dot)nttdata(dot)com>|
|Cc:||torikoshia <torikoshia(at)oss(dot)nttdata(dot)com>, Georgios Kokolatos <gkokolatos(at)protonmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org|
|Subject:||Re: Get memory contexts of an arbitrary backend process|
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Fujii Masao <masao(dot)fujii(at)oss(dot)nttdata(dot)com> writes:
> I'm starting to study how this feature behaves. At first, when I executed
> the following query, the function never returned. ISTM that since
> the autovacuum launcher cannot respond to the request of memory
> contexts dump, the function keeps waiting infinity. Is this a bug?
> Probably we should exclude non-backend proceses from the target
> processes to dump? Sorry if this was already discussed.
> SELECT pg_get_backend_memory_contexts(pid) FROM pg_stat_activity;
FWIW, I think this patch is fundamentally unsafe. It's got a
lot of the same problems that I complained about w.r.t. the
nearby proposal to allow cross-backend stack trace dumping.
It does avoid the trap of thinking that it can do work in
a signal handler, but instead it supposes that it can do
work involving very high-level objects such as shared hash tables
in anyplace that might execute CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS. That's
never going to be safe: the only real expectation the system
has is that CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS is called at places where our
state is sane enough that a transaction abort can clean up.
Trying to do things like taking LWLocks is going to lead to
deadlocks or worse. We need not even get into the hard questions,
such as what happens when one process or the other exits
I also find the idea that this should be the same SQL function
as pg_get_backend_memory_contexts to be a seriously bad decision.
That means that it's not possible to GRANT the right to examine
only your own process's memory --- with this proposal, that means
granting the right to inspect every other process as well.
Beyond that, the fact that there's no way to restrict the capability
to just, say, other processes owned by the same user means that
it's not really safe to GRANT to non-superusers anyway. Even with
such a restriction added, things are problematic, since for example
it would be possible to inquire into the workings of a
security-definer function executing in another process that
nominally is owned by your user.
Between the security and implementation issues here, I really
think we'd be best advised to just reject the concept, period.
regards, tom lane
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