Re: Have an encrypted pgpass file

From: "Tels" <nospam-pg-abuse(at)bloodgate(dot)com>
To: "Tom Lane" <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
Cc: "Alvaro Herrera" <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, "Marco van Eck" <marco(dot)vaneck(at)gmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Have an encrypted pgpass file
Date: 2018-07-20 21:22:24
Message-ID: 157cf1504a827b39b2193b177aea311f.squirrel@sm.webmail.pair.com
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Moin,

On Wed, July 18, 2018 7:25 pm, Tom Lane wrote:
> Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
>> Seems to me that passing %-specifiers to the command would make it more
>> useful (%u for "user", "host" etc) -- your command could refuse to give
>> you a password for the superuser account for instance but grant one for
>> a read-only user.
>
> It would also provide a *very* fertile source of shell-script-injection
> vulnerabilities. (Whaddya mean, you tried to use a user name with a
> quote mark in it?)

Little Bobby Tables, we call him. :)

I'm also concerned that that would let anybody who could alter the
environment then let arbitrary code be run as user postgres. Is this
something that poses a risk in addition to the current situation?

Best regards,

Tels

In response to

Responses

Browse pgsql-hackers by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Yura Sokolov 2018-07-20 21:28:09 Re: [HACKERS] Two pass CheckDeadlock in contentent case
Previous Message Tels 2018-07-20 21:18:13 Re: Non-portable shell code in pg_upgrade tap tests