From: | "Tels" <nospam-pg-abuse(at)bloodgate(dot)com> |
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To: | "Tom Lane" <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
Cc: | "Alvaro Herrera" <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, "Marco van Eck" <marco(dot)vaneck(at)gmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: Have an encrypted pgpass file |
Date: | 2018-07-20 21:22:24 |
Message-ID: | 157cf1504a827b39b2193b177aea311f.squirrel@sm.webmail.pair.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Moin,
On Wed, July 18, 2018 7:25 pm, Tom Lane wrote:
> Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
>> Seems to me that passing %-specifiers to the command would make it more
>> useful (%u for "user", "host" etc) -- your command could refuse to give
>> you a password for the superuser account for instance but grant one for
>> a read-only user.
>
> It would also provide a *very* fertile source of shell-script-injection
> vulnerabilities. (Whaddya mean, you tried to use a user name with a
> quote mark in it?)
Little Bobby Tables, we call him. :)
I'm also concerned that that would let anybody who could alter the
environment then let arbitrary code be run as user postgres. Is this
something that poses a risk in addition to the current situation?
Best regards,
Tels
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