Re: pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check

From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
To: Simon Riggs <simon(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check
Date: 2017-01-27 13:13:33
Message-ID: 13392.1485522813@sss.pgh.pa.us
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Simon Riggs <simon(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
> [ good general plan ]

> 3. Make a list of all functions that would cause security problems.
> One by one, precisely. If we did remove all superuser checks we would
> need this list documented to advise people of the risks, so it must
> exist before any commit can be made, assuming we believe in
> documentation. Notice that I am after risk documentation,

Yeah, I think documentation is the crux of the issue. If there is some
non-obvious reason why letting somebody use pg_ls_dir() is more of a
security hazard than it appears on the surface, the answer is to document
that so DBAs can decide for themselves whether to take the risk.

Count me +1 for removing hard-wired superuser checks, but carefully
and with an overall plan.

regards, tom lane

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