| From: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net> |
|---|---|
| To: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Josh Berkus <josh(at)agliodbs(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: Specification for Trusted PLs? |
| Date: | 2010-05-27 22:03:15 |
| Message-ID: | 1274997795.18581.52.camel@vanquo.pezone.net |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On fre, 2010-05-21 at 14:22 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 2:21 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
> > Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> >> So... can we get back to coming up with a reasonable
> >> definition,
> >
> > (1) no access to system calls (including file and network I/O)
> >
> > (2) no access to process memory, other than variables defined within the
> > PL.
> >
> > What else?
>
> Doesn't subvert the general PostgreSQL security mechanisms? Not sure
> how to formulate that.
Succinctly: A trusted language does not grant access to data that the
user would otherwise not have.
I wouldn't go any further than that. File and network I/O, for example,
are implementation details. A trusted language might do some kind of
RPC, for example. The PL/J project once wanted to do something like
that.
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