| From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
|---|---|
| To: | Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog(at)svana(dot)org> |
| Cc: | Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, Albe Laurenz <all(at)adv(dot)magwien(dot)gv(dot)at>, Peter Eisentraut *EXTERN* <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
| Subject: | Re: Security leak with trigger functions? |
| Date: | 2006-12-15 17:16:53 |
| Message-ID: | 11788.1166203013@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog(at)svana(dot)org> writes:
> The trigger never runs as the owner of the table AIUI, only ever as the
> definer of the function or as session user.
Yeah. This might itself be seen as a bug: I think you could make a
reasonable case that the default behavior ought to be to run as the
table owner (but still overridable if trigger function is SECURITY
DEFINER, of course). In the current situation a table owner can use
a trigger function as a trojan horse against anyone modifying the
table.
And then there's the question of functions run as a result of rule
definitions. That's a lot harder to fix, but (I think) triggers would
be relatively easy to do something about.
regards, tom lane
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