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Re: Spoofing as the postmaster

From: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>
To: Trevor Talbot <quension(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: Tomasz Ostrowski <tometzky(at)batory(dot)org(dot)pl>,Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>,Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org,Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Brendan Jurd <direvus(at)gmail(dot)com>
Subject: Re: Spoofing as the postmaster
Date: 2007-12-24 00:59:32
Message-ID: (view raw, whole thread or download thread mbox)
Lists: pgsql-hackers
* Trevor Talbot (quension(at)gmail(dot)com) wrote:
> There are various platform-specific security features that might be
> useful, like reserved port ranges and file permissions, but they are
> so specific to the scenario they're designed for that it's hard to
> create a generic solution that works well by default -- especially if
> you want to run without requiring administrative privileges in the
> first place.

Agreed.  A guarentee that the process listening on a particular port is
what you're expecting isn't something that upstream can give.  It needs
to be done through some situation-specific mechanism.  There are a
number of options here, of course: SSL, Kerberos, SELinux, even things
like the tiger IDS.  Reserved ports really aren't all that great a
solution in the end anyway, to be honest.



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