Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption

From: Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>
To: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>
Cc: Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog(at)svana(dot)org>, Greg Stark <gsstark(at)mit(dot)edu>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Christopher Kings-Lynne <chriskl(at)familyhealth(dot)com(dot)au>, Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org, Andreas Pflug <pgadmin(at)pse-consulting(dot)de>, Dave Page <dpage(at)vale-housing(dot)co(dot)uk>
Subject: Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption
Date: 2005-12-23 16:16:31
Message-ID: 43AC22DF.80108@dunslane.net
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Stephen Frost wrote:

>Is it actually doing challenge-response where the challenge is different
>each time?
>

The docs say:

AuthenticationMD5Password

The frontend must now send a PasswordMessage containing the password
encrypted via MD5, using the 4-character salt specified in the
AuthenticationMD5Password message. If this is the correct password,
the server responds with an AuthenticationOk, otherwise it responds
with an ErrorResponse.

A little investigation reveals that this is port->md5salt which is 4
random bytes set up fresh per connection (see src/backend/libpq/auth.c
and src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c). So it seems indeed to be a
true (small) one time challenge token, unless I've missed something.

cheers

andrew

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