Re: pg_authid.rolpassword format (was Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol)

From: Michael Paquier <michael(dot)paquier(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de>, Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, David Steele <david(at)pgmasters(dot)net>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Julian Markwort <julian(dot)markwort(at)uni-muenster(dot)de>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, Valery Popov <v(dot)popov(at)postgrespro(dot)ru>
Subject: Re: pg_authid.rolpassword format (was Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol)
Date: 2016-12-14 10:15:28
Message-ID: CAB7nPqQ28o6ocOdbidOVmxxcKDMP=woZ=hvAVHKKAjAUtjZNyQ@mail.gmail.com
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 5:51 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
> The tip of the work branch can now do SCRAM authentication, when a user has
> a plaintext password in pg_authid.rolpassword. The reverse doesn't work,
> however: you cannot do plain "password" authentication, when the user has a
> SCRAM verifier in pg_authid.rolpassword. It gets worse: plain "password"
> authentication doesn't check if the string stored in pg_authid.rolpassword
> is a SCRAM authenticator, and treats it as a plaintext password, so you can
> do this:
>
> PGPASSWORD="scram-sha-256:mDBuqO1mEekieg==:4096:17dc259499c1a184c26ee5b19715173d9354195f510b4d3af8be585acb39ae33:d3d713149c6becbbe56bae259aafe4e95b79ab7e3b50f2fbd850ea7d7b7c114f"
> psql postgres -h localhost -U scram_user

This one's fun.

> I think we're going to have a more bugs like this, if we don't start to
> explicitly label plaintext passwords as such.
>
> So, let's add "plain:" prefix to plaintext passwords, in
> pg_authid.rolpassword. With that, these would be valid values in
> pg_authid.rolpassword:
>
> [...]
>
> But anything that doesn't begin with "plain:", "md5", or "scram-sha-256:"
> would be invalid. You shouldn't have invalid values in the column, but if
> you do, all the authentication mechanisms would reject it.

I would be tempted to suggest adding the verifier type as a new column
of pg_authid, but as CREATE USER PASSWORD accepts strings with md5
prefix as-is for ages using the "plain:" prefix is definitely a better
plan. My opinion on the matter has changed compared to a couple of
months back.

> It would be nice to also change the format of MD5 passwords to have a colon,
> as in "md5:<hash>", but that's probably not worth breaking compatibility
> for. Almost no-one stores passwords in plaintext, so changing the format of
> that wouldn't affect many people, but there might well be tools out there
> that peek into MD5 hashes.

Yes, let's not take this road.

This work is definitely something that should be done before anything
else. Need a patch or are you on it?
--
Michael

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