Re: SE-PgSQL patch review

From: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)ak(dot)jp(dot)nec(dot)com>
To: Greg Stark <gsstark(at)mit(dot)edu>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, jd(at)commandprompt(dot)com, David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Itagaki Takahiro <itagaki(dot)takahiro(at)oss(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)kaigai(dot)gr(dot)jp>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: SE-PgSQL patch review
Date: 2009-12-03 01:27:49
Message-ID: 4B171415.2020003@ak.jp.nec.com
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Greg Stark wrote:
> So I'm unclear what advantage this has for Redhat and sysadmins over
> just setting up the database directly but then I'm unclear what the
> advantage is for SELinux in the first place so I'm probably just not
> in the target audience for it. But this seems like it would be
> directly analogous. I suppose an admin would be able to delegate more
> control to a new admin

We (security engineers) consider to coordinate access controls on
whole of the system, not only database, although it might be an
irritating wordage for pgsql-hackers.

Needless to say, database is one of the most significant software
components nowadays, but not all. From the perspective of security
administration, we want to restrict user's privileges using
a centralized basis, called security policy.

The basis needs to be independent from structures of a certain
subsystem, such as OS or DBMS. SELinux is well suitable for the
requirements in Linux.
Note that SELinux is implemented as a feature of OS in fact, but it
makes its access control decision based on only a couple of security
contexts which is a class-independent identifier.
(It is called "reference monitor" in security region.)

It is not a good idea to invent an another framework again for
whole of the system security, because many of userspace applications
already support SELinux features. It also means stuff to manage security
context of resources, not only applying additional access controls based
on SELinux policy like SE-PgSQL.
For example, "ls -Z" shows security context of files, "mv" keeps
security context of files, even if user tries to move a file across
filesystems, "tar --selinux" support backup/restore security context
of the files, ...

There are various kind of options, however, SELinux provides most
widespread support on various kind of software components.

If we would be Oracle, we may be able to provide whole of the software
components. But it is not right way in OSS community.

Thanks,
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)ak(dot)jp(dot)nec(dot)com>

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