Re: SSL over Unix-domain sockets

From: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>
To: Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>
Cc: PG Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: SSL over Unix-domain sockets
Date: 2009-03-25 13:27:32
Message-ID: 49CA3144.3020304@gmx.net
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Magnus Hagander wrote:
>> I imagine for example, we could invent an additional sslmode of the sort
>> prefer-but-not-if-local-socket, which could be the default.
>
> That parameter is already pretty complex, not sure it's a great idea to
> make it even more so :(

I think there is a firm difference between complex and having a large
number of things to choose from. By your definition, a float type would
be a complex. Uh ... hahah.

> Perhaps it's enough to add a "localssl" row to pg_hba.conf?

That defeats the point, I think. You don't want the server to determine
whether the client should verify the server.

>> The other question is whether sslverify=cn makes sense, but that may be
>> up to the user to find out.
>
> Without finding a way to have that make sense, you don't actually fix
> the potential MITM problem (at least not in many common scenarios), so I
> think that needs to be considered before we put anything in.

Yeah, the problem is that there is only one server certificate. Is it
possible/does it make sense to add an additional cn to the certificate?

Another thought I had is to somehow employ hostaddr, as in
"hostaddr=/tmp host=real.hostname.lan".

Another^2 thought is to just examine the certificate for the local host
name, which the client can find out itself.

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