From: | Christopher Kings-Lynne <chriskl(at)familyhealth(dot)com(dot)au> |
---|---|
To: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
Cc: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: Fwd: init scripts and su |
Date: | 2004-08-06 04:57:08 |
Message-ID: | 41130FA4.1040902@familyhealth.com.au |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
>>During the time between the daemon launch and it closing it's file
>>handles and calling setsid(2) (which some daemons don't do because
>>they are buggy) any other code running in the same UID could take over
>>the process via ptrace, fork off a child process that inherits the
>>administrator tty, and then stuff characters into the keyboard buffer
>>with ioctl(fd,TIOCSTI,&c) (*).
>
>
> (a) And there would be untrusted code running as postgres exactly why?
>
> (b) Seems to me the real security bug here is the mere existence of that
> ioctl call.
I was asked on IRC just why we can't have user=postgres and
group=postgres in the postgresql.conf, and simply when we are run as
root, switch to that user and group.
Chris
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