Bruce Momjian <pgman(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us> writes:
> > My take on the matter is that we shouldn't invest any more effort in
> > crypt-based solutions (here crypt means specifically crypt(3), it's
> > not a generic term). The future is double encryption using MD5 ---
> > or s/MD5/more-modern-hash-algorithm-of-your-choice/, the exact choice
> > is irrelevant to my point. We ought to get off our duffs and implement
> > that, then encourage people to migrate their clients ASAP. The crypt
> > code will be supported for awhile longer, but strictly as a
> > backwards-compatibility measure for old clients. There's no reason to
> > spend any additional work on it.
> > For the same reason I don't see any value in the idea of adding
> > crypt-based double encryption to clients. We don't really want to
> > support that over the long run, so why put effort into it?
> The only reason to add double-crypt is so we can continue to use
> /etc/passwd entries on systems that use crypt() in /etc/passwd.
Haven't many systems (at least Linux and FreeBSD) switched from this
to other algorithms as default, like MD5? (and usually found in /etc/shadow)
Trond Eivind Glomsrød
Red Hat, Inc.
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