Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks

From: Pavel Stehule <pavel(dot)stehule(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>
Cc: pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks
Date: 2012-12-18 17:38:23
Message-ID: CAFj8pRCO7KhxwXbLRL_cGry-hbZKOfXqLELLupwybeAjT7ZoGw@mail.gmail.com
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2012/12/18 Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>:
> There are some system administration functions that have hardcoded
> superuser checks, specifically:
>
> pg_reload_conf
> pg_rotate_logfile
>
> Some of these are useful in monitoring or maintenance tools, and the
> hardcoded superuser checks require that these tools run with maximum
> privileges. Couldn't we just install these functions without default
> privileges and allow users to grant privileges as necessary?

isn't it too strong gun for some people ???

I believe so some one can decrease necessary rights and it opens doors
to system.

> pg_read_file
> pg_read_file_all
> pg_read_binary_file
> pg_read_binary_file_all
> pg_stat_file
> pg_ls_dir

is relative dangerous and I am not for opening these functions.

power user can simply to write extension, but he knows what he does/

Regards

Pavel

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