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Re: [HACKERS] Query cancel and OOB data

From: ocie(at)paracel(dot)com
To: tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us (Tom Lane)
Cc: mgittens(at)gits(dot)nl, hackers(at)postgreSQL(dot)org
Subject: Re: [HACKERS] Query cancel and OOB data
Date: 1998-05-26 21:17:16
Message-ID: 9805262117.AA00754@dolomite.paracel.com (view raw or flat)
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Tom Lane wrote:
> 
> "Maurice Gittens" <mgittens(at)gits(dot)nl> writes:
> > This may be true. The point I'm trying to make is that using one
> > way-functions together with a shared secret will make it possible to
> > avoid denial of service attacks which rely on replaying the "magic
> > token".
> 
> > Again I assumed it to be understood that the pid of the particular backend
> > would exchanged with the client during the initial handshake. It would also
> > be included (together with the shared secret e.g. the password and
> > and some form of a sequence id) in the one-way hash.
> 
> Ah, now I think I see your point: you want to encrypt the cancel request
> so that even a packet sniffer could not generate additional cancel
> requests after seeing the first one.  That seems like a good idea, but
> there is still the problem of what to use for the encryption key (the
> "shared secret").  A password would work in those authentication schemes
> that have a password, but what about those that don't?

Aha!

I'm slowly working through back emails, so I apologize if someone else
already posted this.  If we want to create a shared secret between the
postmaster and the client, we should think about the Diffe-Helman
algorithm.  

For those unfamiliar with this, we start by picking large numbers b
and m.  The client picks a number k and then sends K=b^k%m, while the
server picks a number l and sends L=b^l%m.  The client calculates
L^k%m and the server calculates K^l%m, and these numbers are
identical.  A third party eavesdropping on the conversation would only
get K and L, and would have no idea what the shared number is, unless
they can calculate the computationally infeasible discrete logarithm.

Anyway, something to think about.

Ocie

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Subject: Re: [HACKERS] Query cancel and OOB data (fwd)
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