Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> I don't particularly care for that solution; it seems like a kludge.
> I've kind of wondered whether we ought to have checks in all the ALTER
> routines that spit up if you try to ALTER an extension member from any
> place other than an extension upgrade script... but that still
> wouldn't prevent the extension owner from dropping the members out of
> the extension and then modifying them afterwards. I'm not sure we
> want to prevent that in general, but maybe there could be some
> locked-down mode that has that effect.
Right, I wasn't too clear about that, but I meant that we'd have some
sort of locked-down state for an extension that would forbid fooling
with its contents. For development purposes, or for anybody that "knows
what they're doing", adding/subtracting/modifying member objects is
mighty handy. But a non-superuser who's loaded an extension that
contains C functions ought not have those privileges for it.
regards, tom lane
In response to
pgsql-hackers by date
|Next:||From: Robert Haas||Date: 2012-07-20 19:51:04|
|Subject: Re: Event Triggers reduced, v1|
|Previous:||From: Robert Haas||Date: 2012-07-20 19:39:33|
|Subject: Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re:
Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)|