Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy)

...and on Fri, Mar 05, 2004 at 12:08:02PM +0000, Dave Ewart used the keyboard:
> >
> > [1] There are ways of avoiding having to enter the info manually, but
> > they're very tricky to implement securely.
>
> Not sure I follow this - there's no point AT ALL in using LoopAES if you
> can mount the encrypted partitions without needing manual intervention
> at boot time.
>

Why not, Dave? As far as I understand it, one of the major values of fs-level
data encryption was protection from the abused data being collected via the
means of stolen laptops or even failed hard disks that've been handed over
to various data-rescue labs.

If a machine is reasonably secure both locally and remotely (i.e. secure-
-enough passwords, rotated on a regular basis and frequently enough, or even
some sort of PKID mechanism such as smartcards etc. and proper access control
for local security, tight and reasonably reliable encrypted authentication and
authorization for remote use), implementing an extra layer of any level of
security is plain senseless and simply too expensive, both in terms of CPU
overhead and thus performance drop (in the event of application-level
encryption, for example), and time dedicated to research and implementation,
as far as I'm concerned. One is better off by improving techniques in active
use, investigating for the real weaknesses of their information system or
dedicating the time to finding a better general solution that would cover
as many areas as possible in one step.

Same goes for interactive booting. In the world where even power failures
are accounted for and automated, what does a user have to do with booting
a machine? Implementing strong authentication in boot loaders for any kind
of configuration other than the default would be perfectly sufficient, if
you ask me. Also, if I may remind you at this point, human failure has so
far remained to be one of the top reasons for security compromises, social
engineering not being an uncommon one, so eliminating an extra point of
failure in the case of an operator being required to guide the machine
through the boot process doesn't harm in my opinion.

One of the most important guidelines in implementing and assuring security
for one's data would be the fact that security pays off only as long as the
total cost of its implementation is lower than or equal to the maximum
reasonably expectable harm done in the case of a security breach.

Cheers,
--
Grega Bremec
Senior Administrator
Noviforum Ltd., Software & Media
http://www.noviforum.si/