> My take on the matter is that we shouldn't invest any more effort in
> crypt-based solutions (here crypt means specifically crypt(3), it's
> not a generic term). The future is double encryption using MD5 ---
> or s/MD5/more-modern-hash-algorithm-of-your-choice/, the exact choice
> is irrelevant to my point. We ought to get off our duffs and implement
> that, then encourage people to migrate their clients ASAP. The crypt
> code will be supported for awhile longer, but strictly as a
> backwards-compatibility measure for old clients. There's no reason to
> spend any additional work on it.
> For the same reason I don't see any value in the idea of adding
> crypt-based double encryption to clients. We don't really want to
> support that over the long run, so why put effort into it?
The only reason to add double-crypt is so we can continue to use
/etc/passwd entries on systems that use crypt() in /etc/passwd.
Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us
pgman(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us | (610) 853-3000
+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue
+ Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania 19026
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